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Abstract 
This paper addresses the way optimal cash holdings decisions may be affected in episodes 
of adverse liquidity shocks. Motivated by the recent financial crisis, we are particularly 
interested in understanding how firm characteristics can explain differences in the 
adjustment speed to desired cash holdings, and how these characteristics determine whether 
a firm is more or less affected during a liquidity crisis. To address those issues, we use a 
large panel dataset with quarterly information of Chilean firms during the period 1996 
through 2009. In line with some previous empirical evidence, our findings show that 
leverage, banking debt, liquid assets, size and volatility affect cash holdings. We also find 
that liquidity crises have had an overall negative and economically significant effect on the 
firms’ cash holdings and this effect varies across firm size. In addition, our results reveal 
other important component of heterogeneity across firms: we find that medium-sized firms 
are less capable of adjusting cash holdings than do small and large firms. 
 
Resumen 
En este trabajo se analiza empíricamente cómo la liquidez de las empresas —medida por la 
tenencia de caja y activos equivalentes— se ve afectada durante episodios de restricciones 
crediticias. Se analiza, además, si ciertas características de las firmas determinan una mayor 
o menor velocidad de ajuste a los niveles deseados de liquidez. También se estudia si 
existen efectos distintos de las crisis de liquidez que dependan de estas características. Para 
ello, se utiliza un panel con información trimestral de empresas chilenas durante el período 
1996-2009. Coherentemente con la evidencia para otras economías, se encuentra que el 
endeudamiento, el acceso a deuda bancaria, la liquidez de los activos, el tamaño y la 
volatilidad de las ventas son determinantes importantes de la liquidez de las empresas. Los 
resultados indican que las mayores restricciones crediticias han tenido un efecto negativo y 
económicamente significativo sobre la liquidez de las empresas chilenas, y que este efecto 
difiere según el tamaño de la firma. Además, los resultados revelan un comportamiento 
heterogéneo de las empresas ante shocks de liquidez. Se encuentra que las empresas de 
tamaño mediano presentan una velocidad de ajuste menor que la de las empresas pequeñas 
o grandes. 
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   A relatively large bunch of literature has studied the determinants of firms’ 
liquidity, specifically the factors affecting corporate cash holdings (Almeida et. al, 2002; 
Dittmar et al., 2003; Opler et al., 1999; Pinkowitz and Willimanson, 2001; Kim et al., 
1998; Bruinshoofd and Kool, 2004 and Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004). Few works, however, 
have analyzed how firms adjust cash holdings when facing liquidity shocks such those 
experienced by many economies during the recent financial crisis
1.  
  In this paper we investigate differences across firms in the way they are affected by 
liquidity shocks. In particular, we are interested in understanding how firm characteristics 
may accelerate or to impede the adjustment in cash holdings. We also analyze how these 
characteristics determine whether a firm is more or less affected during a liquidity crisis. In 
our empirical analysis we study whether smaller firms are more likely to suffer from the 
effects of liquidity shocks. To address those questions, we use a large panel dataset with 
quarterly information for firms in Chile during the period 1996 through 2009. We are now 
aware of other papers studying similar questions. In general, little is known about the 
effects of liquidity crisis on firm performance in developing countries. There are some 
previous studies analyzing the effects of the Asian crisis during the 1990´s, but most of then 
emphasize different issues than those addressed in this paper
2.  
  There are several reasons why this may be an important issue. First, a liquidity shock 
may reduce a firm’s liquidity and negatively affect their survival chance. Second, liquidity 
shocks may have amplified effects on aggregate activity and employment whenever some 
                                                 
1 One exception is Elkinawy and Stater (2007) who investigate the determinants of cash holdings and firm 
value in Argentina, Mexico and Brazil. They analyze how two specific crises – Mexico in 1994-1995 and 
Brazil in 1999 – altered the determinants of these variables. However, they do not analyze how the crisis 
directly affected firms liquidity. 
2 See, for example, Claessens, Djankov and Xu (2000) and Blalock, Gertler and Levine (2008). 
  1firms cannot obtain enough cash to fulfill their short-term obligations. Third, the 
identification of differences in firms exposure to liquidity shocks could be important for 
policy makers monitoring financial stability. 
  In line with some of the previous empirical evidence, our findings show that size, 
leverage, banking debt and liquid assets affect cash holdings negatively. We also find that 
higher industry volatility increases cash holdings, which is consistent with the idea that 
higher liquidity is partially motivated by precautionary motives. Considering liquidity 
crises, we find evidence that firms have been less able to adjust cash holdings when facing 
negative shocks and these effects vary widely across firm size. In general, episodes of 
liquidity shortage have a negative and economically significant effect on firms’ cash 
holdings, especially on smaller firms. 
  The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the second section, we present 
our data and the main stylized facts on corporate cash holdings across firms and industries. 
In the third section, we present the empirical methodology and discuss the theoretical 
foundations for our estimations. In the fourth section, we discuss our results under two 
alternative definitions of liquidity crises. In the fifth section, we present our conclusions 
and ideas for future research.   
2.  Data Description and Main Facts 
  We obtain our data from listed firms at the Chilean Superintendency of Securities and 
Insurance (SVS), available on a quarterly basis from 1986 to 2009. According to Chilean 
regulation, companies that offer publicly stocks or debt instruments must be registered and 
file certain information. These firms must provide financial statements and other 
information on a quarterly basis, and be audited once a year. The same is true for 
companies with more than 500 shareholders and those for which at least 10% of their 
  2subscribed capital is in the hands of a at least 100 people. There are also cases of specific 
registry requirements
3 and others of voluntary registration
4. Thus, this database provides 
more coverage than those that only include the largest and most traded firms. This group of 
companies holds 100% of local bond issuance, over 70% of corporate external liabilities 
(bank loans and bonds), but only 20% of local bank loans
5.  For our empirical analysis we 
use financial data from the firms’ non-consolidated financial statements for the period 
1996Q1-2009Q1. Even though we try to follow the methodology in previous literature as 
much as possible, we are subject to availability constraints in our choice of financial 
variables. We were not able to find information on some variables, such as dividend 
payments, advertising and R&D investment and ownership structures, which previous 
literature has found to be significant determinants of cash holdings 
  We dropped from our sample of financial firms, companies with toll road, and other 
infrastructure concessions (project finance), major state-owned enterprises (ENAP, 
CODELCO, METRO, EFE)
6, and small firms related to the educational, sports and 
entertainment sectors, most of which report voluntarily and/or only on a yearly frequency. 
Our final sample consists of 479 firms and 15.402 observations (on average, 290 firms each 
quarter).   
  One limitation of this dataset is that it is biased to large public issuing firms. Thus, 
our results may be not applicable to smaller firms, which tend to be important in terms of 
domestic bank lending. However, the firms in this sample represent a very large proportion 
                                                 
3 Such as requirements to bus service companies in the concessions of the new public transportation system in 
the city of Santiago (Plan Transantiago). 
4 In these cases, companies aim to have better access to different types of financing.  
5 Source: Superintendency of Securities and Insurance, Superintendency of Banks and Financial Institutions 
and Central Bank of Chile. 
6 These firms are not considered in our sample because they have government specific guarantees and credit 
access terms that differ from the rest of the companies in the sample. These features provide them with 
enough support in the event of financial distress, even though they can present weak financial indicators. 
  3of Chilean GDP
7. In addition, the sample represents the best source of information given its 
complete financial detail, standardized format and availability through quarterly financial 
statements (FECU). Thus, it contains more financial information than other widely used 
sources in Chile such as the National Annual Industry Survey (ENIA). 
  The distribution of assets and liabilities across sectors is relatively concentrated. 
Electric utilities, paper & forest products, retail and mining represent 60% of assets and 
almost 70% of financial debt. This distribution has changed over time, as some sectors 
became more important in terms of assets and liabilities. Table 1 shows that between 1996 
and 2008, the retail and marine & air transportation sectors have increased their 
participation, whereas the sectors of telecommunications and food, beverage & tobacco 
have reduced their importance in terms of total assets and debt.  
  Another potential problem with this dataset is the use of non-consolidated 
information. In theory, consolidated data is better suited to the aim of financial analysis, as 
it shows the net financial position of a group of companies, eliminating the double counting 
that arises when the individual data of various subsidiaries of a group are aggregated. 
Indeed, simply adding the individual accounts of companies that belong to the same group 
leads to overstatement of financial costs and debt ratios, as the flows of financing and 
liabilities between the members of the group are counted twice. For the purpose of liquidity 
assessment, using only individual accounts can hide liquidity problems of subsidiaries that 
are part of the group or economic unit (consolidated) but are not listed in the SVS. The 
opposite is also true. A parent company with liquidity problems at individual level may 
actually have enough liquid assets in a subsidiary which is not listed in the SVS. The extent 
of the impact on the analysis caused by this phenomenon is directly linked to the number of 
                                                 
7 The financial debt (banks and bonds) represented almost 41% of GDP at the end of 2008. 
  4intermediate parent companies created by the groups. Despite that, we use non-consolidated 
data because consolidated data is not available for the period of 1996 through 2000 
covering the Asian crisis of 1997-1998
8. 
  In Figure 1 we show some stylized facts about firm cash holdings during three 
episodes of liquidity crisis
9. We compare average cash holdings – weighted by assets – for 
the period during the crisis and the average in the corresponding quarters before the crisis
10. 
For all firms, we find evidence of a small reduction in cash holdings only during the first 
crisis. For the two more recent crises, the evidence shows an increase in average cash 
holdings in respect to pre-crisis period. The evidence for large firms is very similar to that 
of whole sample. This may be expected given that we weighted our observations by assets 
(Panel B). However, for the rest of the firms, the evolution of cash holdings looks 
somewhat different. Medium sized firms drastically reduced their cash holdings during the 
first crisis and tended to maintain the same cash to assets ratio during the two most recent 
crises (Panel C). In the case of small firms, there is a general reduction in cash holdings 
over time, and also a reduction compared to the pre-crisis period for all three episodes 
(Panel D). This could suggest that liquidity crises may disproportionately affect the smaller 
firms
11. 
  We analyze how cash holdings have evolved in different industries. Figure 2 present 
evidence on this issue. An upward (downward) sloping line indicates that, compared to the 
                                                 
8 We have compared indicators using consolidated and non-consolidated information for the period 2001-
2009 and, even though there are changes in liquidity holdings, there are not important differences for a firm or 
industry over time. 
9 The period of liquidity crises are defined in detail in the next section.  
10 The first period corresponds to the Asian crisis, between the first and third quarter of 1998. To compare 
with similar quarters, the pre-period crisis is between the first and third quarter of 1997. The same procedure 
is applied for the other two crises. 
11 These groups of firms are defined according to the distribution of assets (in real terms) for every year. The 
small firms are those with total assets lower than the 33% of the distribution. Large firms are those with total 
assets higher than the 66% of the distribution. 
  5pre-crisis period, the average cash holdings in that industry has increased (reduced) during 
the crisis. Note how the evidence is highly heterogeneous across different sectors and 
episodes of liquidity crises. With some minor exceptions, most of industries experienced a 
reduction in cash holdings during the first crisis, while during the other two crises the 
evidence is mixed. In fact, some sectors, for example food, experienced an increase in cash 
during the first crisis, but a reduction in the last two episodes. This evidence suggests that 
industries differ greatly in terms of exposure to liquidity shocks and that, apparently, there 
are not systematic differences across different episodes.  
3. Methodological  Issues 
  We follow the previous literature on determinants of cash holdings, specifically 
Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) which estimate the following equation: 
     it t i it it it X Cash Cash ε α α β δ + + + + = −1    (1) 
 Where  Cash is firm cash holdings measured as the ratio of total cash and equivalent 
items to total assets,  i α and  t α are firm and time fixed effects respectively, and the vector X 
includes variables that theoretical models suggest as important for explaining firm-specific 
differences in cash holdings.  
  The theoretical models emphasize two main determinants of cash holdings: 
transaction costs and precautionary motives. These two determinants define the type of 
variable that we include in the vector X
12. In terms of transaction costs, we use the size of 
firms to capture the idea that large firms have less information asymmetry than small firms, 
and then lower cost of external financing because of scale economies resulting from a 
                                                 
12 All of the explanatory variables are defined in Table 2. Table 3 present the descriptive statistics of these 
variables. 
  6substantial fixed cost component of security issuance costs (Barclay and Smith, 1996). 
Following this argument, the hypothesis is that larger firms should hold less cash.  
  The literature suggests that another determinant of the cost of funding could be 
leverage. In the presence of transaction costs, higher leverage may act as substitute for cash 
holdings. Thus, an increase in debt financing would be associated with lower cash holdings. 
However, it has been also argued that high debt may also increase the probability of 
financial distress, and through this effect, to increase cash holdings (Ozkan and Ozkan, 
2004).  
  Access to banking debt may also affect cash holdings decisions. Following the idea of 
Fama (1985) that banks have some comparative advantage in minimizing information costs 
and can get access to no-publicly available information, banks loans can signal positive 
information about firms. Thus, firms with more bank debt are expected to have better 
access to external finance and less need to hold cash. In our specifications, we distinguish 
between short-term and long-term banking debt. 
  Finally, we include other three variables that may affect cash holdings: cash flow, 
assets liquidity, and sales volatility. Firms with higher cash flows, due to the nature of their 
business, are expected to have lower cash holdings because cash flow provides a ready and 
immediate source of liquidity. Meanwhile, greater liquid assets reduce the holdings of cash 
because the firm may be in better position to fulfill short-term liquidity needs. Finally, in 
the case of sales volatility, a positive relationship is expected because a higher variability 
increases cash holdings as a way to hedge uncertainty (precautionary motive). 
    The dynamic specification in equation (1) has been justified by the existence of 
adjustment costs on some unobserved level of desired cash holdings (Ozkan and Ozkan, 
2004). These costs may impede instantaneous variations in cash holdings following 
  7changes in firm-specific characteristics and/or random shocks. Adjustments costs could be 
exacerbated during liquidity crises when the financial system may experience severe 
restrictions to normal functioning. In fact, the current financial crisis has shown that central 
banks sometimes need to intervene through liquidity injections to the financial system. 
  We extend this specification to analyze four main issues. First, we are interested in 
analyzing how episodes of liquidity crises have affected overall cash holdings. We include 
a dummy variable for these episodes in the specification of equation (1). Second, we study 
how firm liquidity adjustments may be affected during a crisis. To do so, we include an 
interaction term between the lagged dependent variable and the dummy variable for 
liquidity crises. Third, we study whether firm size affects adjustment of cash holdings by 
introducing an interaction between lagged cash holdings and size dummy variables. Fourth, 
we analyze how the effect of crises, if any, depends on firm size. We introduce interactions 
between the dummy for liquidity crises and size dummy variables. One maintained 
hypothesis in poor financially developed economies is that smaller firms have lower access 
to credit, and these firms could then be proportionally more affected in episodes of liquidity 
shortfalls.  
  Considering these four issues, the empirical model is specified as: 
it t i it
it t it it t it t it it
X
Z Crisis Z Cash Crisis Cash Crisis Cash Cash
ε α α β
δ δ δ δ δ
+ + + +
+ + + + + = − − − * * * 4 1 3 1 2 1 1 0
 
 Where  Crisis is a dummy variable for episodes of liquidity shocks and Z is a set of 
two size dummy variables: one for medium sized firms and the other for large sized firms. 
These size categories are defined according to the size distribution for each year. Medium 
  8sized firms are those with assets larger than the 33% percentile and lower than the 66% 
percentile. Larger firms are those with assets larger than the 66% percentile
13. 
  We need to define episodes of liquidity crisis. To do that, we look at periods where 
the economy has been affected by a significant liquidity shock. The recent fall in liquidity 
following the Lehman’s bankruptcy of September 2008 is one example. The previous Asian 
crisis is another potential candidate. In order to define these episodes in a more formal way, 
we use deviations of the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) from its trend using the Hodrick-
Prescott filter. A liquidity period crisis is defined for those quarters where the MPR is over 
one standard deviation from its trend level. 
  As shown in Figure 3, in addition to well known crises episodes, this procedure 
allows us to identify certain quarters during the period 2001-2002 as another period of 
liquidity shock.  Thus, under this definition, we have three crises periods. The Asian shock 
analysis covers the period 1998Q2-1998Q4. The second one is the period 2001Q3-2002Q1. 
The third one is the episode of the current financial crisis and covers the period 2008Q3-
2008Q4.  
  We also use an alternative definition of liquidity crisis taking those periods when the 
inter-banking loans rate is significantly above – one standard deviation – the monetary 
policy rate. These are periods where the banking system faces severe funding shortages and 
the interest rate of loans among banks is increased relative to normal ones. This translates 
in important restrictions in the banking system ability to satisfy liquidity need of firms.  
  In Table 4, we present the episodes identified using the two definitions of liquidity 
crisis. Compared to the previous indicator, this includes one additional episode of liquidity 
                                                 
13 We have also estimated the model dividing the sample in four different size classes and using total assets as 
a continuous variable for size. The results do not change substantially. 
  9crisis. There are also some small differences in which quarters the crises fall compared with 
the previous procedure. As we show in the next section, however, the results tend to be 
similar using these two definitions. 
  The estimation of this model using standard fixed effects present some econometric 
challenges. First, there is an expected correlation between the error term and the lagged 
dependent variable. Second, most of the variables contained in the vector X are not strictly 
exogenous. One solution to these problems is to use the Arellano and Bover (1995) and 
Blundell and Bond (1998) estimator for dynamic panel data, known as System GMM. This 
estimator augments Arellano and Bond (1991) by making the additional assumption that the 
first differences of instrument variables are uncorrelated with the fixed effects
14. 
  A crucial assumption for the validity of GMM is that the instruments are exogenous. 
When the model is overidentified, the validity of these assumptions can be tested using the 
standard GMM test statistic for overidentifying restrictions, or Sargan / Hansen test, under 
the null that the implied moment conditions are valid
15. In this context, another key 
assumption is that there is no serial correlation in the disturbances it ε . The null hypothesis 
is that there is not second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals (see 
Arellano and Bond, 1991)
16.    
4. Results 
  In Table 5, we present our first set of results using the definition of liquidity crisis 
corresponding to significant deviations from the monetary policy rate. Considering the 
                                                 
14 The Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond estimator builds a system of 2 equations – the original equation as well 
as the transformed one –allowing the introduction of more instruments and it can dramatically improve 
efficiency. 
15 See Sargan (1958) and Hansen (1982). 
16 As we show in the last rows of Tables 5 and 6, we cannot reject that instruments are valid and that there is 
not second order autocorrelation.  
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previous works. The exception is the positive, but not significant effect of cash flow on 
cash holdings. The coefficient of lagged cash holdings is positive and significantly different 
from zero at 1%, providing evidence that there are adjustment costs for reaching a target 
cash ratio. In general, our results show evidence that liquidity crises are associated with 
lower cash holdings, although the parameter is not significant in column (1). 
  Like Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), we find that the effect of leverage on cash holdings is 
negative and significant. We also find that a large proportion of liquid assets and banking 
debt (both short and long term) reduce cash holdings. Similar to previous studies, our 
results show that larger firms maintain less cash holdings. Also, we find that an increment 
in industry volatility is associated with an increase in cash holdings. 
  In Columns (3), (4), and (5) we sequentially include the interactions between lagged 
cash holdings and crises, the interactions between lagged cash holdings and firm size, and 
finally the interactions between firm size and crises. The effect of the main determinants of 
cash holdings tends to be robust to the inclusion of these interactions. We find that the 
interaction of crises and lagged cash holdings is positive and significant, suggesting that 
adjustment costs are larger during episodes of negative liquidity shocks.  
  The interactions between lagged cash holdings and dummy variables for medium and 
large firms are positive and significant. Moreover, the parameter is higher for medium size 
firms. This implies that there is a nonlinear relationship between size and adjustment costs. 
Our results suggest that medium firms are those with larger adjustment costs in comparison 
with small and large firms.  
  11  Finally, the interaction between crisis and size dummy variables are positive and 
significant, showing that medium and large firms are relatively less affected than small 
firms during episodes of liquidity crisis 
17.  
  In Table 6 we present our results using an alternative definition of crisis. In this case, 
we use episodes of significant deviations of the inter-banking rate from the monetary policy 
rate. The results for the explanatory variables are similar to the previous estimations. The 
positive and significant coefficient for the lagged dependent variable indicates that there is 
persistence in cash holdings. We confirm that sales volatility are positively associated with 
cash holdings and leverage, assets liquidity, bank debt and size affect negatively to cash 
holdings. 
  Regarding the interactions terms capturing heterogeneous effects of crisis and 
different adjustment costs by firms, we find that all of them are statistically significant. 
Thus, our evidence of heterogeneous effects is robust to an alternative definition of 
liquidity crisis. To shed light on this issue we calculate the parameter of adjustment 
velocity for the entire sample and for the three different size categories
18. For all of these 
parameters, we also calculate the confidence interval from estimations of column (4) in 
Tables 5 and 6 to look at whether differences are statistically significant.  
  The parameters and the confidence interval for the velocity of adjustment are shown 
in Figure 4. The velocity of adjustment is approximately 0.20-0.30 when it is evaluated at 
the sample mean and it is larger for small firms. Note that, according to the confidence 
                                                 
17 However, as we show below, when we calculate the parameter for the effect of liquidity crisis on different 
firm sizes we find that these differences are statistically significant only for small firms. 
18 The parameter for the velocity of adjustment is given by ( ) Large Medium Crisis l m 3 3 2 0 1 δ δ δ δ − − − − , 
where Crisis , Medium and   are the sample mean of the dummy variables included in the estimation. 
This parameter is computed as 
Large
1 ( Crisis 2 0 ) δ δ − −  for small firms, ( ) Medium Crisis m 3 2 0 1 δ δ δ − − −  for 
medium firms, and () Large l 3 Crisis 2 0 1 δ δ δ − − −  for large firms.  
  12intervals displayed as the line crossing the bar, these values for small and large firms are 
also statistically higher than the velocity of adjustment calculated for medium sized firms. 
This evidence is similar for both indicators of liquidity crisis.  
  We also present the calculations of the crisis dummy for the entire sample and 
according to firm size. These are shown in Figure 5. First, we find that a liquidity crisis is 
associated with a reduction in cash holding of between 0.4% and 1.5% of total assets in the 
short run, and about 7.0% to 8.5% in the long run
19. These figures are also significant 
economically
20. Interestingly, both measures of liquidity crises show that there are 
significant differences in the effect of liquidity only for small firms. As shown in Figure 5, 
we can reject the hypothesis that the coefficient for small firms is the same as those for 
medium and large firms.   
  Thus, these results are in line with the hypothesis that smaller firms have lower access 
to credit and consequently could be more affected in episodes of liquidity shortages. 
Moreover, the non-monotonic relationship between size and adjustment costs may be due 
to the fact that intermediate size firms are more dependent on external funding for financing 
liquidity than smaller firms, but they do not have as many funding alternatives as larger 
firms.  
5. Conclusions 
  This paper use a large panel dataset of Chilean firms to address how cash holdings 
decisions may be affected by episodes of negative liquidity shocks. We are particularly 
motivated by the effects of the recent financial crisis and the lack of evidence on these 
                                                 
19 In Figure 5 we show only the short run parameters. The long-run parameters are obtained by dividing the 
short-term parameters by the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable. 
20 The mean of the dependent variable (cash holdings over total assets) is 0.049 and the standard deviation is 
0.126 (see Table 3). 
  13issues for developing countries. This evidence is particularly interesting for these countries 
whose financial markets are less developed and for whom it has been traditionally argued 
that smaller firms are disproportionally affected during episodes of liquidity shortages.   
  Our main results are mostly similar with evidence provided by previous empirical 
analysis. We find that leverage, bank debt, liquid assets, and size reduce cash holdings. 
Confirming the idea that cash holdings are also determined by precautionary motives, we 
find that time-varying industry sales volatility increases cash holdings. However, our 
results do not show a significant effect of cash flows on cash holdings.  
 Regarding episodes of liquidity crisis, the evidence presented in this paper show that 
negative liquidity shocks are associated with an economically significant reduction in cash 
holdings. We find that this negative effect is larger for small firms and it might be 
consequence of a lower access to credit.  
  We have also analyzed whether firms differ in their ability to adjust cash holdings 
when facing. The evidence found on this regard reveals that there is nonlinear relationship 
between size and adjustment costs; medium-sized firms are those with larger adjustment 
costs in comparison with small and large firms.     
  Finally, the fact that monetary authorities implement special interventions during 
periods of liquidity shortage in order to inject liquidity in financial markets is a relevant 
issue for future research, especially during the recent crisis where most of public authorities 
around the world intervened actively to reduce the negative effects of the international 
liquidity shock. It may be quite interesting to study how these interventions have 
differentiated effect across firms. 
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  18Table 1 
Total Assets and Financial Debt by sector 
(Percentage) 
 Total  Assets    Financial Debt 
  1996 2000 2005 2008   1996 2000 2005 2008 
Food, Beverage & Tobacco  10,2  8,6 8,4 7,5    10,0 8,4  7,2  6,5 
Retail  6,5 5,9  11,5  12,2    5,1 5,8  11,0  15,2 
Homebuilding  &  Construction  4,8 3,3 3,1 2,9    2,9 3,5 2,5 2,4 
Paper & Forest Products  17,1  20,3  14,6  14,3    11,8  10,2  14,2  12,3 
Marine  &  Air  Transportation  2,9 4,4 4,8 5,8    1,7 3,0 3,0 7,1 
Metals & Mining  8,5  8,6  8,8  11,1    10,7  11,6  8,6  11,6 
Telecommunications  10,8  9,8  8,8  7,2   23,0 13,9 10,1  6,1 
Water  Utilities  3,7 4,0 6,2 5,2    2,0 4,1 8,7 7,3 
Electric  Utilities  25,2 25,0 24,5 24,0    31,8 33,8 33,1 29,7 
Health  Care  0,8 0,7 0,5 0,5    0,5 0,5 0,6 0,7 
Conglomerates  9,4 9,4 8,8 9,4    0,4 5,2 1,0 1,1 
Total  100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0  100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Based on Standard & Poor’s Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS).   
 
  19Table 2 
Variables Definition 
Variable Definition 
Cash  Cash and equivalent items/Total assets 
Cash flow  Operating profit / Total assets 
Volatility  Yearly standard deviation of industry sales growth. 
Leverage  (Current liabilities + Non-current liabilities) / Total Assets 
Liquidity  (Current assets – Current liabilities / Total assets) - Cash 
Bank Debt ST  Short-term  bank  borrowing  / (Current liabilities + Non-current 
liabilities) 
Bank  Debt  ST  Long-term bank borrowing / (Current liabilities + Non-current 
liabilities) 
Size   Three categories defined from the size distribution: Small, Medium, 
Large 
Crisis   i)  Dummy variable defined for quarters when the monetary policy 
rate is one standard deviation above its trend level 
ii)  Dummy variable defined for quarters when the inter-banking 
rate is one standard deviation above the monetary policy rate. 
Quarterly Dummy 
variables (53) 
For each quarter from the first quarter of 1996 to the first quarter of 
2009. 
 
  20Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev. 
Cash 14102  0.052  0.134 
Cash Flow  14102  0.001  1.301 
Volatility 14102  0.043  0.061 
Leverage 14102  0.281  0.104 
Liquidity 14102  0.024  0.103 
Short Term Bank Debt  14102  0.121  0.183 
Long Term Bank Debt  14102  0.155  0.231 
Medium   14102  0.339  0.473 
Large   14102  0.340  0.474 
Crisis 1 (Monetary Policy Rate)  14102  0.160  0.366 
Crisis 2 (Inter-Banking Rate)  14102  0.300  0.458 














  22 Table 5 
Panel Data Regressions: Liquidity Crisis based on Monetary Policy Rate 
 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Cash(-1) 0.632  0.575  0.515  0.508 
 (12.81)**  (8.28)**  (5.74)**  (5.53)** 
Cash Flow  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 (0.19)  (0.11)  (0.04)  (0.07) 
Volatility 0.044  0.043  0.037  0.037 
 (2.55)*  (2.46)*  (2.15)*  (2.15)* 
Leverage -0.018  -0.018  -0.019  -0.019 
 (2.78)**  (2.66)**  (2.61)**  (2.59)** 
Liquidity -0.018  -0.018  -0.019  -0.019 
 (2.78)**  (2.66)**  (2.61)**  (2.59)** 
Bank Debt ST  -0.027  -0.028  -0.025  -0.025 
 (3.59)**  (3.28)**  (2.89)**  (2.88)** 
Bank Debt LT  -0.015  -0.015  -0.016  -0.016 
 (3.63)**  (3.29)**  (3.3)**  (3.28)** 
Medium -0.023  -0.024  -0.037  -0.041 
 (4.13)**  (3.66)**  (3.95)**  (3.78)** 
Large -0.026  -0.027  -0.037  -0.041 
 (4.31)**  (3.81)**  (3.74)**  (3.63)** 
Crisis -0.002  -0.020  -0.022  -0.041 
 (0.40)  (2.97)**  (3.00)**  (3.17)** 
Crisis*Cash(-1)     0.309  0.343  0.369 
     (4.63)**  (4.36)** (4.29)** 
Cash(-1)*Medium       0.313  0.318 
       (3.53)**  (3.52)** 
Cash(-1)*Large       0.199  0.201 
       (2.34)*  (2.33)* 
Crisis*Medium         0.024 
         (2.56)* 
Crisis*Large         0.026 
         (2.77)** 
Constant 0.056  0.061  0.067  0.070 
 (5.73)**  (4.97)**  (4.75)**  (4.63)** 
Observations 14102  14102  14102  14102 
Instruments 60  61  63  65 
Sargan p-value  0.018  0.126  0.321  0.340 
AR(1) p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
AR(2) p-value  0.129  0.274  0.245  0.259 
Robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. All regressions include unreported 
quarter-specific dummy variables. 
Following Roodman (2009),   and   were used as instruments and the dimension of the 
instrument matrix was reduced by collapsing it horizontally in order to mitigate instrument proliferation that 
weakens Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions.   
2 − it Cash 2 − it X
 
  23Table 6 
Panel Data Regressions: Liquidity Crisis based on Inter-Banking Rate 
 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Cash(-1)  0.632 0.471 0.377 0.367 
  (12.81)**  (5.19)** (3.05)** (2.90)** 
Cash  Flow  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.19) (0.01) (0.13) (0.25) 
Volatility  0.044 0.051 0.045 0.044 
  (2.55)* (2.47)* (2.09)* (2.08)* 
Leverage  -0.018 -0.019 -0.020 -0.020 
 (2.78)**  (2.59)**  (2.53)*  (2.54)* 
Liquidity  -0.018 -0.019 -0.020 -0.020 
 (2.78)**  (2.59)**  (2.53)*  (2.54)* 
Bank Debt ST  -0.027  -0.031  -0.029  -0.029 
  (3.59)** (3.43)** (3.02)** (3.00)** 
Bank Debt LT  -0.015  -0.016  -0.017  -0.017 
  (3.63)** (3.30)** (3.33)** (3.30)** 
Medium  -0.023 -0.025 -0.041 -0.050 
  (4.13)** (3.66)** (3.98)** (3.75)** 
Large  -0.026 -0.029 -0.042 -0.052 
  (4.31)** (3.81)** (3.81)** (3.64)** 
Crisis  -0.009 -0.034 -0.038 -0.061 
  (2.28)*  (4.88)** (4.66)** (4.30)** 
Crisis*Cash(-1)      0.389 0.451 0.481 
     (4.59)**  (4.16)** (4.17)** 
Cash(-1)*Medium      0.342  0.343 
       (3.64)**  (3.60)** 
Cash(-1)*Large      0.274  0.277 
       (2.77)**  (2.77)** 
Crisis*Medium       0.030 
         (2.83)** 
Crisis*Large         0.033 
         (3.01)** 
Constant  0.056 0.069 0.079 0.086 
  (5.73)** (5.19)** (4.91)** (4.71)** 
Observations  14102 14102 14102 14102 
Instruments  60 61 63 65 
Sargan  p-value  0.018 0.035 0.129 0.130 
AR(1)  p-value  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2)  p-value  0.129 0.531 0.696 0.672 
Robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. All regressions include unreported 
quarter-specific dummy variables. 
Following Roodman (2009),   and   were used as instruments and the dimension of the 
instrument matrix was reduced by collapsing it horizontally in order to mitigate instrument proliferation that 
weakens Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions. 
2 − it Cash 2 − it X
  24Figure 1 
Cash and Equivalent Items to Total Assets by Firm Size (*) 
(Weighted average) 






























































 (*)Defined from the distribution of total assets in constant prices. 
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(*) Based on Standard & Poor’s Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS).   
(**) The sharp rise of the ratio in the construction industry during the third crisis is 
principally due to the increase of cash of Madeco, after the sale of its Wire and Cable Unit 
at the end of 3Q2008. Madeco represents in our sample 26% of total assets and 89% of cash 
and equivalents items of the construction industry at 4Q2008. 
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Source: Central Bank of Chile and author’s calculations.
  27Figure 4 
Adjustment Velocity by Firm Size 
































  28Figure 5 
Liquidity Crisis Effects by Firm Size 
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